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1 Introduction
Whether like-with-like assortment favours the evolution of cooperation is a critical ques-
tion in social evolution and population biology more generally. Assortment can result if
interactions are often between related individuals (e.g., if the population is ‘viscous’), or
if individuals prefer to interact with those to whom they are similar (homophily). Any
theoretical analysis of the relationship between assortment and cooperation requires the
synthesis of two models: one for cooperative interactions, and one for population assort-
ment.
The simplest models of cooperation are games between two players, where each player
has available to it the same two strategies: cooperate (C) and defect (D). The paradig-
matic example is the prisoners’ dilemma (Rapoport and Chammah 1965; Axelrod 1984;
Nowak 2006b), but many other two-strategy games can be interpreted as cooperative
dilemmas as well (Nowak 2012).
A simple model of assortment in two-strategy games was developed by Grafen (1979).
In his model, individuals can be of two types, corresponding to the two strategies in the
underlying game. In a given time-step, an individual interacts with a same-type individual
with probability r, and a random member of the population (possibly same-type, possibly
not) with probability 1−r. Higher values of r correspond to greater degrees of assortment
in the population. This model has been extended in many ways (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza
1982; Bergstrom 2003; Jansen and Van Baalen 2006; van Veelen et al. 2012; Alger and
Weibull 2013; Van Cleve and Akcay 2014; Allen and Nowak 2015)
Does increased assortment tend to favour cooperation? Of course, this question is
not new, and has been approached from numerous angles. Most analyses have been in
a deterministic, infinite-population setting. In such a setting, Hamilton (1971, App. A)
determines, for several particular games of interest, whether selection is in favour of cooper-
ators or defectors in a population with an interaction structure identical to that in Grafen
(1979). Extending this, Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza (1982) analyze the effect of Grafen’s
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assortment parameter on the conditions for evolutionary stability of cooperation and de-
fection. They show that, for cooperative dilemmas broadly defined (two cooperators do
better than two defectors, and a defector does better than a cooperator when faced with
a cooperator), there are threshold assortment levels 0 < r∗∗ < r∗ < 1 such that, if r > r∗,
cooperation is the only ESS, but if r < r∗∗, defection is an ESS (and the only one in the
case of a prisoners’ dilemma). That is, sufficiently high relatedness renders cooperation
evolutionarily stable, while sufficiently low relatedness renders defection evolutionarily
stable.
More recently, the effect of assortment on the evolution of cooperation has been studied
in the context of finite populations subject to stochastic evolution. In this setting, a natural
measure of the success of a strategy is the weight of its pure state (where the population is
monomorphic for that strategy) in the stationary distribution of the evolutionary process
(Fudenberg and Imhof 2006; Allen and Tarnita 2014; Veller and Hayward 2016). In a two-
strategy game (such as the usual cooperative dilemmas) with symmetric, small mutation
rates, the superiority of one strategy over the other corresponds to its having a higher
fixation probability (Fudenberg and Imhof 2006; Allen and Tarnita 2014). In a very
general model of social evolution that allows for arbitrary dependence of payoffs on strategy
frequencies and population structure of any sort, Van Cleve (2015) derives, in the limit of
weak selection, the conditions under which the fixation probability of cooperation exceeds
that of defection.
An alternative way to study whether assortment aids cooperation is to determine the
effect on key parameters of the evolutionary process, positive or negative, of marginal
changes in the assortment parameter. In the economics literature, this general approach
is called ‘comparative statics’: rather than trying to determine the exact effect a change
in one variable has on another, we instead try to determine just the direction of the
effect (its ‘comparative static’). Many empirical studies of social evolution test the broad
‘comparative statics’ statement that increased relatedness should be associated with more
cooperation, and much of social evolutionary theory is interpreted in this way (Frank
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2013). It is therefore important that the comparative statics of social evolution be studied
extensively from a theoretical perspective.
A step in this direction was recently provided by Allen and Nowak (2015), who stud-
ied the effect of assortment on the evolution of cooperation in a finite population subject
to Wright-Fisher evolution. Interaction each period accords with Grafen’s assortment
process, with expected payoffs derived from an underlying two-strategy game. Expected
payoffs are translated to fitnesses according to a linear mapping mediated by a selection
strength parameter w, and the next period’s population composition is chosen stochasti-
cally on the basis of these fitnesses. Allen and Nowak (2015) derive analytical results for
the ‘weak selection limit’, w → 0. In this limit, for most cooperative dilemmas, increasing
relatedness favours cooperation in the sense that it increases the fixation probability of a
single cooperator relative to that of a single defector.
Here, we make use of a relatively recent advance in the study of finite-population
evolutionary game theory to give a more general characterization of the comparative statics
of assortment in Grafen’s model. We model evolution as a Moran process (Moran 1958),
occurring in a finite population that interacts according to Grafen’s assortment model.
Expected payoffs translate to fitnesses according to an exponential mapping mediated by
a selection strength parameter w (Traulsen et al. 2008). With this setup, we can derive a
more general result than Allen and Nowak (2015): for any selection strength w, increasing
r increases the fixation probability of a cooperator relative to that of a defector for the
same set of cooperative dilemmas to which their result applies. We also define a stronger
sense in which increased r favours cooperation, and show that this too holds for a natural
class of cooperative dilemmas: prisoners’ dilemmas, snowdrift games, stag-hunt games,
and some prisoners’ delight games. To distinguish this stronger definition, we provide an
example of a cooperative dilemma where assortment favours cooperation by the weaker
definition of Allen and Nowak (2015), but not by our stronger definition.
For most of this work, we follow in the footsteps of many others (Grafen 1979; Eshel
and Cavalli-Sforza 1982; Bergstrom 2003; Jansen and Van Baalen 2006; Alger and Weibull
4
2013; Van Cleve and Akcay 2014; Okasha and Martens 2015) by treating r as an abstract
assortment parameter without specifying how this assortment arises mechanistically. In
Section 5, however, we illustrate how our model could apply to a nest-structured pop-
ulation. In this setting, the parameter r quantifies the frequency of interaction among
nest-mates.
Our results offer insights into the effect of assortment on the evolution of cooperation,
and highlight the usefulness of the exponential fitness function in evolutionary game theory.
2 The general model
Social interactions are between two individuals, with the payoffs from any one interaction
defined by the payoff matrix
C D
C R S
D T P
Following Nowak (2012), we say that the game is a ‘cooperative dilemma’ if R > P (two
cooperators do better than two defectors) and at least one of the following conditions
holds: (i) T > R (it is better to defect if one’s opponent cooperates), (ii) P > S (it
is better to defect if one’s opponent defects), (iii) T > S (if one interactant cooperates
and the other defects, then the defector does better than the cooperator). The game is a
prisoners’ dilemma if T > R > P > S; it is a snowdrift game if T > R > S > P ; it is a
stag-hunt game if R > T ≥ P > S.
The population is of constant size N . Each member’s type is either cooperator (plays
C) or defector (plays D). Each period, each member of the population receives its expected
payoff from the following interaction: with probability r, it interacts with an individual of
the same type, and with probability 1− r, it interacts with a random member of the pop-
ulation, with each member equally likely (including the individual itself—the possibility
of self-interaction simplifies the analysis).
The population state at a given time is defined by the number of cooperators, i. If
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1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, then the expected payoff to a cooperator and a defector are:
piCi = rR+ (1− r)
iR+ (N − i)S
N
,
piDi = rP + (1− r)
iT + (N − i)P
N
. (1)
These expected payoffs in turn translate to (positive) fitnesses according to some mono-
tonic transformation.
Evolution is modelled as a Moran process (Moran 1958; Nowak 2006a). Each period,
the fitnesses of the cooperators and defectors in the population are calculated as above.
One member is chosen for reproduction; the probability of being chosen is proportional
to fitness. One member of the population is chosen to die; each member is equally likely
to be chosen. A new individual is then born, taking the place of the one chosen to die.
The new individual is of the same type as its parent, the member chosen for reproduction
(which can be the same as the individual that was chosen to die).
Thus, if there are i cooperators this period in the population, with 1 ≤ i ≤ N−1, then
denoting by pi,j the probability that there will be j cooperators next period, we have:
pi,i+1 =
N − i
N
· if
C
i
ifCi + (N − i)fDi
,
pi,i−1 =
i
N
· (N − i)f
D
i
ifCi + (N − i)fDi
,
pi,i = 1− pi,i+1 − pi,i−1. (2)
We term pi,i+1/pi,i−1 the ‘relative rate of increase of cooperation’ at population state i.
This leads to our first definition by which higher assortment can favour cooperation: if it
increases the relative rate of increase of cooperation for all interior i.
Definition 1. Assortment favours cooperation in the strong sense if ∂∂r
pi,i+1
pi,i−1 > 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Notice that, given the Moran process transition probabilities in (2), pi,i+1/pi,i−1 =
fCi /f
D
i . So the condition for assortment to favour cooperation in the strong sense simplifies
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to ∂∂r
fCi
fDi
> 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Now consider the probability that a single cooperator, presently in a population that
is otherwise all defectors, takes over the population; i.e., its ‘fixation probability’, ρC . For
our frequency-dependent Moran process, this is given by (Nowak 2006a):
ρC =
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
i=1
fDi
fCi
.
The fixation probability of a single D in a population otherwise all-C is
ρD =
∏N−1
i=1
fDi
fCi
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
i=1
fDi
fCi
.
From these expressions, the ‘relative fixation probability of cooperation’, ρC/ρD, simplifies
to:
ρC
ρD
=
N−1∏
i=1
fCi
fDi
.
This leads to our second definition by which higher assortment can favour cooperation: if
it increases the relative fixation probability of cooperation.
Definition 2. Assortment favours cooperation in the weak sense if ∂∂r
ρC
ρD
> 0.
The use of the terminology ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ for these definitions is justified by
the fact that the strong definition implies the weak definition: if ∂∂r
fCi
fDi
> 0 for all i =
1, . . . , N − 1, then clearly ∂∂r
∏N−1
i=1
fCi
fDi
> 0.
3 The exponential fitness transformation
Following Blume (1993) and Traulsen et al. (2008), we use an exponential transformation
of expected payoffs to (positive) fitnesses:
fCi = exp
(
wpiCi
)
, fDi = exp
(
wpiDi
)
, (3)
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where w is the strength of selection. We should note, as do Traulsen et al. (2008), that
this choice of transformation is for the most part arbitrary. Any transformation should
translate payoffs to fitnesses monotonically, and in such a way that the fitnesses are positive
(since transition probabilities in the stochastic evolutionary process are proportional to
them). In the common linear transformation, f = 1+wpi, when some payoffs are negative,
the selection strength needs to be sufficiently small to ensure that all fitnesses are positive.
In contrast, the exponential transformation that we use guarantees that all fitnesses are
positive, even if some payoffs in the underlying game are negative.
Moreover, the exponential transformation is more conducive to a ‘multiplicative fitness
effects’ interpretation. If an individual has a total of K interactions, with each interaction
k having a small fitness consequence exp
(
wpik/K
) ≈ 1 + wpik/K, and if these fitness
consequences combine multiplicatively, then the total fitness consequence is
f =
K∏
k=1
exp (wpik/K) = exp
(
w
1
K
K∑
k=1
pik
)
.
If the pik are interpreted as payoffs from an underlying game, then the expression above
can be read as exp (wpi), where pi is the average payoff to the individual. Treating averages
as expectations, this is the same as the expression in (3).
Finally, we note that in the weak selection limit w → 0, the exponential fitness trans-
formation (3) coincides with the usual linear fitness transformation f = 1 + wpi, since
Taylor expanding (3) around w = 0 gives exp (wpi) = 1 + wpi + O(w2). Thus, models
that use the linear fitness transformation and the weak selection limit, such as in Allen
and Nowak (2015) and Nowak et al. (2004), can be thought of as special cases of the
exponential fitness formulation.
4 Results for exponential fitness
We now consider the effect of assortment on the evolution of cooperation when fitnesses
are calculated according to (3). The relative rate of increase of cooperation is calculated
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by successively applying (2) and (3):
pi,i+1/pi,i−1 = fCi /f
D
i = exp
(
w
[
piCi − piDi
])
, (4)
with piCi and pi
D
i as specified in (1).
This allows us to analyze for which games assortment favours cooperation in the strong
sense of Definition 1 (Fig. 1):
Proposition 1. Assortment favours cooperation in the strong sense if R ≥ S and T ≥ P ,
with at least one inequality strict.
Proof. We have from (4) that
∂
∂r
pi,i+1
pi,i−1
= exp
(
w
[
piCi − piDi
])
w
∂
∂r
[
piCi − piDi
]
,
and since the exponential is positive, the sign of ∂∂r
pi,i+1
pi,i−1 is the same as the sign of
∂
∂r
[
piCi − piDi
]
. Writing x := i/N , so that x ∈ (0, 1), we have from (1) that this quan-
tity is given by
∂
∂r
piCi −
∂
∂r
piDi = [R− xR− (1− x)S]− [P − xT − (1− x)P ]
= (1− x)(R− S) + x(T − P ). (5)
If both R ≥ S and T ≥ P , with at least one inequality strict, then (5) is strictly positive for
all x ∈ (0, 1), and therefore for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. So, therefore, is ∂∂r
pi,i+1
pi,i−1 .
Notice that the condition R ≥ S and T ≥ P provides a natural stringent definition
of a cooperative game: No matter what my strategy is, I would prefer that my opponent
cooperate. This condition is satisfied, in particular, by prisoners’ dilemmas (T > R >
P > S), snowdrift games (T > R > S > P ), and stag-hunt games (R > T ≥ P > S). In
fact, the only other cooperative dilemmas – as defined by Nowak (2012) and in Section 2
– that satisfy this condition are those where R > T > S > P ; i.e., a subset of “prisoners’
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R− S
T −P
Assortment	  favors	  
coopera/on	  in	  both	  
senses	  
Assortment	  favors	  
coopera/on	  
	  in	  weak	  
sense	  
Figure 1: A summary of our results for two-player games. Assortment favours cooperation
in the strong sense (increases the relative rate of increase of cooperators for all intermediate
population states) if R ≥ S and T ≥ P , with at least one inequality strict (blue and red
cross-hatch). For large enough population sizes, this is a necessary condition as well.
Assortment favours cooperation in the weak sense (increases the fixation probability of a
single cooperator, relative to a single defector) if, and only if, R− S > P − T (blue).
delight” games (Binmore 2004; Skyrms 2014).
We can also prove a partial converse to Proposition 1, which shows that Proposition
1 can be strengthened to an ‘if, and only if’ statement provided the population size N is
sufficiently large.
Proposition 2. If assortment favours cooperation in the strong sense, then one of the
following three sets of conditions is satisfied:
(2a) R ≥ S and T ≥ P , with at most one inequality strict.
(2b) R > S, T < P , and N < R−S+P−TP−T .
(2c) R < S, T > P , and N < S−R+T−PS−R .
Proof. See Appendix A.
We now determine how much broader the conditions are under which assortment
favours cooperation in the weaker sense of Definition 2.
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As noted by Traulsen et al. (2008), the ratio of fixation probabilities ρC/ρD in the
frequency-dependent Moran process simplifies significantly with the exponential fitness
transformation (3):
ρC
ρD
=
N−1∏
i=1
fCi
fDi
=
N−1∏
i=1
exp
(
w
[
piCi − piDi
])
,
= exp
(
w
N−1∑
i=1
[
piCi − piDi
])
. (6)
But in our case, we have from (1) that for each i, piCi + pi
C
N−i = 2rR+ (1− r)(R+ S) and
piDi + pi
D
N−i = 2rP + (1− r)(T + P ), and if N is even, then piCN/2 = rR+ (1− r)(R+ S)/2
and piDN/2 = rP + (1− r)(T + P )/2. Grouping payoff terms for i and N − i in (6), we see
that, for both odd and even N ,
ρC
ρD
= exp
(
w
N − 1
2
[2rR+ (1− r)(R+ S)− 2rP − (1− r)(T + P )]
)
= exp
(
w
N − 1
2
[(R− P + S − T ) + r(R− P − S + T )]
)
. (7)
This allows us to analyze for which games assortment favours cooperation in the weak
sense of Definition 2 (Fig. 1).
Proposition 3. Assortment favours cooperation in the weak sense if, and only if, R−S >
P − T .
Proof. From (7), we have that
∂
∂r
ρC
ρD
= exp
(
w
N − 1
2
[(R− P + S − T ) + r(R− P − S + T )]
)
w
N − 1
2
(R− P − S + T ).
Since the exponential is positive, ∂∂r
ρC
ρD
> 0 ⇔ R− P − S + T > 0.
This condition corresponds to that found by Allen and Nowak (2015) for assortment
favouring cooperation in the same weak sense, but their result applies only in the weak
selection limit (w → 0), whereas our result holds for all selection strengths.
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A corollary of Proposition 3 follows from a result due to Fudenberg and Imhof (2006).
Consider an evolving finite population of cooperators and defectors, where cooperators
mutate to defectors and defectors to cooperators at the same rate. If this rate of muta-
tion is very small (the ‘weak mutation limit’), the long-run distribution of the (ergodic)
evolutionary process over all population states i = 1, 2, . . . , N is close to a distribution
over just the two pure states all-D (i = 0) and all-C (i = N). This distribution is
given by
(
ρD
ρD+ρC
, ρ
C
ρD+ρC
)
, whose dependence on ρC/ρD can explicitly be seen in the form(
1
1+ρC/ρD
, 1− 1
1+ρC/ρD
)
. If greater assortment increases the ratio ρC/ρD (i.e., if assort-
ment favours cooperation in our weak sense), it also increases the weight on the cooperative
state in this weak mutation limit.
Corollary 1. In the Moran process with symmetric mutation rates, in the weak-mutation
limit, greater assortment increases the stationary distribution’s weight on the cooperative
state all-C if, and only if, R− P − S + T > 0.
If the condition R−P −S + T > 0 holds and mutations are very infrequent, then this
corollary can be interpreted as follows: at a time point far in the future, a population with
a high degree of assortment is more likely to be all cooperating than is a population with
a low degree of assortment. Alternatively, among many evolving populations, cooperation
will be more common among those with high assortment than those with low assortment.
We have demonstrated that, for a large class of cooperative dilemmas, assortment
favours cooperation in our strong sense, and that for an even broader class, assortment
favours cooperation in the weak sense. To demonstrate the utility of the distinction
between our weak and strong definitions, we provide an example of a game in which
assortment favours cooperation in the weak sense but not the strong sense.
Suppose we have a population of size N > 10 interacting according to Grafen’s assort-
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ment model, with payoffs specified by the game
C D
C R = 10 S = 1
D T = 8 P = 9
.
This is a ‘cooperative dilemma’ in the sense of Nowak (2012) because two cooperators get
a higher payoff than two defectors (R > P ), it is better to be the defector in a cooperator-
defector pair (T > S), and it is better to defect if one’s opponent is a defector (P > S).
Here, assortment favours cooperation in the weak sense, because R−P−S+T = 8 > 0.
But assortment does not favour cooperation in the strong sense, because none of the
conditions (2a), (2b), and (2c) holds: (2a) and (2c) fail because T < P ; (2b) fails because
R−S+P−T
P−T = 10 < N .
5 Realization of the model in a nest-structured population
So far we have described the model in abstract terms. Here we show how the model can
be realized in a nest-structured population, with r describing the relative frequency of
interaction among nest-mates.
Consider a population with N nests, each containing a single adult. Each time-step
corresponds to a single (non-overlapping) generation. Each generation, each adult pro-
duces a large number of juveniles. Each juvenile interacts with a large number of others,
a proportion r of these being with juveniles from the same nest, and the remaining pro-
portion 1 − r being with juveniles chosen uniformly from the population at large. These
interactions determine a juvenile’s fitness multiplicatively, so that fitness is an exponential
function of the sum of individual payoffs.
After interaction, a new head for each nest is chosen, forming the next generation of
adults. With high probability (1−µ, where µ 1 represents the migration rate) the new
head of a nest is chosen from among the juveniles who were born at this nest. Otherwise
(with probability µ) the new head is chosen from the juvenile population at large. In each
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case, the choice is made proportionally to fitness.
In the limit µ→ 0, the dynamics of the above model coincide with those of the simple
model we have studied in this paper (up to a rescaling of time). The reason is that, as the
migration rate becomes very small, the probability of there being two migrants in a given
generation becomes negligible compared to that of there being only one migrant. Thus at
most one nest changes its strategy per generation, consistent with the Moran process.
6 Games with more than two players
In reality, many cooperative dilemmas are not pairwise interactions, but involve more
than two players. Here, we shall demonstrate that our methodology can extend to a
particularly simple n-player cooperative dilemma, a linear public goods game. We shall
show that increased assortment favours the evolution of cooperation in this case.
Interactions occur in groups of size n, where each interactant is either a cooperator (C)
or a defector (D). Assortment is defined as r = P(C|C) − P(C|D), where P(C|D) is the
probability that a randomly chosen interactant of a defector is a cooperator, and P(C|C)
is the probability that a randomly chosen interactant of a cooperator is a cooperator
(Van Veelen 2009). (It is easily seen that P(C|C)− P(C|D) = P(D|D)− P(D|C), so that
this definition does not depend on the labelling of strategies.) This definition is consistent
with that used in our two-player setup above.
Assortment derives from a ‘population structure’, which determines, from the number
of cooperators in the population, their distribution among the interacting groups. For-
mally, in a population of size N , a population structure m (for ‘matching function’) is
a vector-valued function that specifies, for each possible number i of cooperators in the
population, a probability distribution (m[0](i),m[1](i), . . . ,m[n](i)) over the n+ 1 possible
group compositions, so that m[j](i) is the probability that, when there are i cooperators
in the whole population, a randomly chosen group contains exactly j cooperators. (The
subscript in m[j](i) is bracketed to distinguish that this is the number of cooperators in the
group, while we have throughout used an unbracketed subscript to indicate the number
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of cooperators in the whole population.)
One complication arises. In an infinite-population setting (Van Veelen 2011; Jensen
and Rigos 2014; Rigos and Nax 2016), where the proportion x ∈ [0, 1] of cooperators
is specified, it is required that the population structure f , applied to the proportion of
cooperators x, recapitulate that proportion: x =
∑n
j=0 jm[j](x). In our finite-population
case, where the law of large numbers does not apply, N/n groups drawn independently
from the distribution m(i) need not contain a total of i cooperators. To sidestep this
complication, we shall make an assumption analogous to that of self-interaction in the
two-player game setup: interactants in a group are drawn with replacement from the
population, according to the distribution m(i). That is, we shall assume that an individual
can take on multiple positions in the group, so that a group of n need not contain n distinct
individuals.
We shall be interested in the population structures that maintain, for all intermediate
i = 1, 2, . . . , N−1, a constant assortment parameter r. One such population structure, and
a natural extension of the population structure we analyzed for two-player games, is this: A
cooperator’s n−1 group-mates are, with probability r, all cooperators, and with probability
1 − r are drawn randomly and independently from the population (i.e., they constitute
a binomial sample of size n − 1). When there are no cooperators in the population
(respectively, no defectors), then all groups comprise only defectors (respectively, only
cooperators). The exact population structure that leads to a constant r will not matter
in what follows, because the game we shall consider is linear. For general (nonlinear)
n-player games, however, the population structure will matter.
The game played by the n constituents of a group is a linear, or additive, public goods
game. A cooperator produces, at individual payoff cost c to itself, a public good that
provides benefit b to each member of the group. A defector enjoys the benefits of the
public good produced by cooperators in the group, but does not produce any itself. The
payoff to a cooperator in a group with j cooperators is piC(j) = jb − c, while the payoff to
a defector in a group with j cooperators is piC(j) = jb.
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The expected payoff to a cooperator and a defector are, respectively:
piCi = −c+ b+ (n− 1)P(C|C)b;
piDi = (n− 1)P(C|D)b. (8)
With a constant-r assortment process and this game, when there are i cooperators in the
population, we have (Van Veelen 2011):
piCi − piDi = (n− 1)[P(C|C)− P(C|D)]b− c+ b = (n− 1)rb− c+ b.
As before, we calculate fitness exponentially from expected payoffs, and update the
population according to a Moran process. Checking our strong condition by which assort-
ment favours cooperation, Definition 1:
pi,i+1/pi,i−1 = fCi /f
D
i = exp
(
w[piCi − piDi ]
)
= exp (w[(n− 1)rb− c+ b]) ,
so that
∂
∂r
pi,i+1
pi,i−1
= w(n− 1)b exp (w[(n− 1)rb− c+ b]) > 0.
Therefore, assortment favours the evolution of cooperation in the strong sense here.
The above results apply to a linear public goods game. For nonlinear public goods
games, a single assortment parameter does not suffice to characterize the effects of popula-
tion structure on natural selection; rather, a full probability distribution over all possible
group compositions is required (Van Veelen 2009; Ohtsuki 2014). Therefore, while non-
linear public goods games are important from both a theoretical (Archetti and Scheuring
2012) and empirical (Gore et al. 2009) perspective, an analysis of how assortment affects
cooperation in such games is beyond the scope of the current work.
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7 Discussion
We have studied the effect of assortment on the evolution of cooperation, making use of a
simple model of like-with-like assortment in two-strategy games. We have demonstrated
that, for many cooperative games of interest (including prisoners’ dilemmas, snowdrift
games, and stag-hunt games), increased assortment favours the evolution of cooperation
in two senses: it increases the rate at which the cooperative strategy increases in the
population, and it increases the fixation probability of cooperators relative to that of
defectors.
Most studies of stochastic game theory – for example, Allen and Nowak (2015) in a
setting similar to ours – assume selection to be weak. This assumption is made because
standard stochastic models are otherwise intractable, with analytical results impossible.
Here, making use of an exponential transformation of payoffs to fitnesses instead of the
usual linear one, we have demonstrated that informative analytical results may be obtained
in the more general case allowing any strength of selection.
Moreover, this exponential transformation is not simply a mathematical expediency.
We have argued that it is the appropriate transformation of average payoff to fitness when
fitness derives from many interactions with multiplicative fitness effects. Multiplicative
fitness effects are a common assumption in population genetics (Ewens 2004), but not in
evolutionary game theory, where additive fitness effects are standard.
In addition to their biological import, our results highlight the usefulness of this expo-
nential payoff-fitness transformation in the Moran process [also see Traulsen et al. (2008)],
and suggest that tractable results could be obtained by using this as a model to answer
other questions in social evolution and evolutionary game theory more broadly.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
We prove Proposition 2 by considering all possible cases for the signs of R−S and T −P .
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• From Proposition 3, we know that if P ≥ T and R ≥ S (with at least one inequality
strict), ∂∂r
pi,i+1
pi,i−1 > 0.
• If R ≤ S and T ≤ P , both terms in (5) are non-positive, and so ∂∂r
pi,i+1
pi,i−1 ≤ 0.
• If R < S and T > P , the term R−S in (5) is negative, and the term T−P is positive.
The expression (5) is therefore increasing in x := i/N , and therefore smallest when
i = 1. So, in this case, ∂∂r
pi,i+1
pi,i−1 > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , N − 1 if, and only if, (5) is
positive when i = 1. When i = 1, (5) equals [(N − 1)(R − S) + (T − P )]/N , which
is positive if, and only if, N < (S −R+ T − P )/(S −R).
• If R > S and T < P , the term R−S in (5) is positive, and the term T−P is negative.
The expression (5) is therefore decreasing in x := i/N , and therefore smallest when
i = (N − 1)/N . So, in this case, ∂∂r
pi,i+1
pi,i−1 > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , N − 1 if, and only
if, (5) is positive when i = (N − 1)/N . When i = (N − 1)/N , (5) equals [(R− S) +
(N − 1)(T −P )]/N , which is positive if, and only if, N < (R−S +P − T )/(P − T ).
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